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COMMENTS
The Exclusionary Rule in Context
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the po-
tent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Justice Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court decisions of the past decade
have made most of the Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the states
via the fourteenth amendment. 2 These decisions have also dramatically
expanded the scope of those guarantees as applied to both federal and
state procedure.3 The general trend of those decisions has been further
to "constitutionalize" criminal procedure. The decisions contributing to
this trend may well have produced more significant new developments
in criminal procedure than all of the decisions of the previous century.
Probably the most highly publicized Supreme Court decisions of
1277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
2See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (guarantee against double jeopardy):
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial in criminal cases); Washington v.
Texas. 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 286 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to
confront opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to have excluded
from criminal trials any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment). In light of these
rulings, two earlier cases might now be viewed as suggesting that the rights to public trial and to
notice of the nature and cause of accusations are also incorporated within the fourteenth amend-
ment. hi re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
The only criminal procedure guarantees remaining outside the fourteenth amendment are the
eighth amendment prohibition against excessive bail and the fifth amendment requirement of
prosecution of infamous crimes by grand jury indictment.
'in addition to the cases cited in note 2 supra, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969):
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also cases cited in note 4
infra.
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the past decade have been those imposing new limitations upon basic
police investigatory techniques.4 These decisions have revised and ex-
panded the limitations previously imposed in areas such as search and
seizure and police interrogation and have imposed restraints upon prac-
tices such as lineup identification and wiretapping that had not pre-
viously been subject to constitutional regulation. With these new limita-
tions added to the extensive body of prior law, the area of police investi-
gation has become one phase of the criminal process that is extensively
regulated by constitutional limitations.
The one major development common to the imposition of these
constitutional limitations has been the so-called "exclusionary rule."
This rule provides for the exclusion from a criminal prosecution of
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court currently enforces an exclusionary rule in state and
federal criminal proceedings as to four categories of constitufional vio-
lations: (1) searches and seizures conducted in violation of the fourth
amendment;5 (2) confessions obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth
amendments;6 (3) identification testimony obtained in violation of these
amendments;7 and (4) evidence obtained by methods so "shocking" that
the use of such evidence would violate the due process clause.8
Especially in the search and seizure context, the exclusionary rule
has engendered much controversy as the method of enforcing vital con-
stitutional rights In fact, in dissenting opinions in two decisions near
'See. e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) (same); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure); Kaiser v. New
York, 394 U.S. 280 (1969) (electronic eavesdropping); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968) (same);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (same); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (eye-
witness identification procedures); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (same).
sMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
RRochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The exclusionary rule is also applied to wiretap-
ping evidence obtained or proposed to be used in violation of federal law. See, e.g., Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378 (1968). Electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping are not considered in this comment.
'See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 1; Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 42 (1968); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929 (1965); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959); Katz, Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp
v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule it
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Miscon.
duct by the Police, 52 J. CRu. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319.
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the end of the 1970-71 term, the exclusionary rule came under attack
to a degree unprecedented in the modern Court.10 On Tuesday, January
11, 1972, an hour-long television program entitled The Advocates was
devoted to an evaluation of the exclusionary rule," and many commen-
tators have recently undertaken vigorous and extensive re-evaluations
of the rule.'2 Although to date most of the debate has been concerned
with the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure context, this com-
ment will focus on the three other mentioned contexts as well.
II. A BIT OF HISTORY AND LAW
3
The exclusionary rule has traditionally been applied to violations
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since that
provision specifically prohibits the use of such compelled testimony in
a criminal case. In addition, the application of the rule has been easily
justifiable where unconstitutional police activities produce inherently
unreliable evidence. 4 The Court, however, has not always recognized
the exclusion of relevant and trustworthy evidence as an appropriate
"0Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). In his dissent in Bivens Chief Justice Burger set forth his views about the
deficiencies of the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure context, urged an alternative remedy
via legislation, and outlined his own model for congressional consideration. Id. at 411-24.
"The Advocates, Tues., Jan. I1, 1972, on PBS television network.
"See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 9.
"Part II is a thumbnail survey of the evolution of the exclusionary rule intended to provide
the reader with a quick reference to the bare holdings of the most significant Supreme Court cases.
Some familiarity with the qualifying doctrines of "standing" and "harmless error" and a grasp of
the scope and limitations of the rule itself mortIhorough than is presented here are essential to
an understanding of the rule's operation. For the purposes of this comment's principal objec-
tives-an examination of the policy arguments for and against the rule and an exploration of
alternative methods for enforcing constitutional safeguards againsa police misconduct-the abbre-
viated discussion in this part is deemed sufficient background.
Concerning the "harmless error" doctrine, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970);
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1964); Cameron & Osborn, II, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless,
1971 L. & Soc. ORDER 23; Note, Harmless Error-A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970).
On standing, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Parman v. United States, 399
F.2d 559 (D.D.C. 1968); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure,
34 U. CHi. L. Rev. 342 (1967).
Concerning scope and other limitations see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Comment, Search and Seizure by
Private Parties: An Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 653 (1970).
"See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confession obtained by torture).
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remedy to redress violations of a constitutional command-the fourth
amendment- 5 that does not refer even indirectly to the admissibility of
evidence.
Until 1914 the general view of the nation's courts, state and federal,
was that all material and relevant evidence should be admissible in a
criminal case without regard to the manner in which it was obtained."
For a period after 1914 the Court held that evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers could not be used in a federal criminal prosecution. 7
But since the Court refused to exclude from federal criminal prosecu-
tions evidence illegally seized by state officers, there developed the "sil-
ver platter" doctrine whereby evidence of a federal crime obtained by
state officers in the course of an unlawful search could be turned over
to federal authorities for use in a federal prosecution, so long as federal
agents did not participate in the unlawful conduct. 8
Before Mapp v. Ohio9 was decided in 1961, the Court's position
was that state courts were not constitutionally required to exclude ille-
gally obtained evidence. In Wolf v. Colorado° the Court held that
although the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches was "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' "2 and was
thus incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, state courts were not
required to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments.2 The Court felt that the exclusionary rule of
Weeks was not derived explicitly from the fourth amendment; rather,
it was merely a matter of "judicial implication" and hence was not
"in some of the Court's earlier fourth amendment search and seizure decisions, it indicated
that the exclusionary rule was predicated on both the fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). More recently,
however, the restrictions upon search and seizure have been derived by the Court, with the excep-
tion of Justice Black, solely from the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See
Justice Black's dissent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493-510 (1971), in which he
reiterated his view that only the fifth amendment supports the exclusionary rule in the search and
seizure context.
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-98 (1914).
'7See. e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S.
124 (1932), Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
-338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2Id. at 27. The Court in Wolf adopted the Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),
fundamental rights interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. 338 U.S. at 26. This approach is
no longer used today. Palko was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
21338 U.S. at 28.
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binding on the states. Therefore, the majority opinion in Wolf held that
the exclusionary rule was not fundamental to the basic rights protected
by the fourteenth amendment and that the states were free to choose
other remedies to prevent unlawful searches." In a concurring opinion,
Justice Black suggested that the exclusionary rule, applied in federal
cases under Weeks, was "not a command of the fourth amendment but
* . . a judicially created rule of evidence" 4 adopted pursuant to the
Court's supervisory power over federal courts. At the time of the Wolf
decision seventeen states applied an exclusionary rule and the remainder
rejected it.?
As the Supreme Court was presented with more and more cases of
state violations of the fourth amendment, it became apparent that the
remedies chosen by the states to prevent unlawful conduct were ineffec-
tive. As a result, in Rochin v. California the Court created a narrow
"exception" to Wolf by holding that the fourteenth amendment did
require exclusion from state trials of evidence obtained by police activi-
ties that were so flagrantly abusive of individual privacy as to "shock
the conscience" of a civilized society.
2
In Rochin, three detectives broke into the defendant Rochin's room
and saw two capsules on a night table next to his bed. Rochin quickly
put these capsules into his mouth. The detectives immediately jumped
on him to extract the capsules, but were unsuccessful. They then took
him to a hospital where a doctor, under police direction, forced an
emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach. As a result of
the "stomach-pumping," Rochin vomitted. The vomitted matter con-
tained two morphine capsules which were used in evidence to convict
Rochin. Justice Frankfurter's opinion concluded that this was "conduct
that shocks the conscience"-" and that Rochin had been convicted "by
methods that offend the Due Process Clause" 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Rochin decision has not been overruled.
In- Elkins v. United States,29 the Supreme Court abrogated the
"silver platter" doctrine, relying partly on the fact that the Wolf




-342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).
21ld. at 172.
211d. at 174.
-364 U.S. 206 (1960).
105319721
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ble searches and seizures applied to the states. With the Elkins decision
it became quite evident that the Wolf doctrine was being eroded.
Finally, in 1961, in the famous Mapp v. Ohio3" decision, the Court
overruled Wolf and held both that the fourteenth amendment fully in-
corporated the fourth amendment guarantee and that the exclusionary
rule was an essential element of that guarantee. The Court in Mapp
noted that other remedies against unreasonble searches had proven inef-
fective3' and that the trend in the state courts was toward adoption of
the exclusionary rule.3 2 By disallowing the use in a criminal prosecution
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence and thus removing one incentive
the police might otherwise have to disregard the fourth amendment, the
exclusionary rule was designed "to compel respect for the constitutional
guarantee."33 The Court argued that the rule constituted the only
effectively available way to accomplish that end. The Court discounted
Justice Cardozo's argument that the rule permitted "[t]he criminal...
to go free because the constable had blundered" 34 in favor of "the
imperative of judicial integrity."" "Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." 6
The Mapp analysis was subsequently extended to require exclusion
of evidence obtained incidentally during an unconstitutional search and
seizure. In Wong Sun v. United States, " the Supreme Court excluded
an admission of a defendant made in direct response to an unconstitu-
tional entry and arrest. The Court held that all evidence, tangible or
intangible, obtained so immediately from a violation of the fourth
amendment constituted a "fruit" of official illegality and was therefore
subject to the exclusionary rule.38
At this point, the two other important contexts in which the rule
-367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31Id. at 651-53.
vId. at 660. By the time the Mapp decision was rendered more than one-hair of the states
had adopted an exclusionary rule.
31Id. at 656. The Court was quoting its own opinion in Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960).
3"367 U.S. 659. Justice Cardozo's comment was made in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13. 21.
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
35367 U.S. at 659. quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
31367 U.S. at 659.
-371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960): Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
:1371 U.S. at 484-85.
1054 [Vol. 50
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
applies will be briefly examined. First, confessions obtained in violation
of the fifth and sixth amendments must be excluded from the evidence
in a criminal prosecution. "9 The fifth amendment provides the privilege
against self incrimination.4" This privilege applies in any civil or criminal
proceeding and also to any custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect
by police.4" The sixth amendment, of course, is concerned with the right
to counsel. Secondly, the rule requires the exclusion of identification
testimony and evidence obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth
amendments.
Before Miranda v. Arizona" the Court's scrutiny of the use of
confessions in criminal cases focused on the issue of "voluntariness."
The criteria for determining whether a confession was admissible as
"voluntary" or barred as "coerced" changed over the years, but the
case-by-case process of articulating constitutional requirements for in-
terrogation persisted throughout that period.43 As early as. 1897 the
Supreme Court held that an involuntary or "coerced" confession was
not admissible in federal courts, 4  and in 1936 the Court held that the
use of a coerced confession as evidence against the accused in a state
criminal trial constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.4"
The law of "coerced confessions," however, became the subject of
criticism. Many felt, and justly so, that the law in this area was inade-
quate to combat intimidation, coercion, and ignorance. What really
goes on at the police station was felt to be largely a matter of the
defendant's testimony versus that of the police. In response, the Su-
preme Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to the
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Recently the Supreme Court held in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), that although
illegally obtained evidence cannot be used as part of the prosecution's case against the accused, it
can be used to impeach the testimony of the defendant if he chooses to take the witness stand in
his own defense. The Harris case involved a Miranda violation, but the decision would seem to be
applicable to other situations involving illegally obtained evidence.
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); United
States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951); United States ex reL Weinstein v. Fay, 333 F.2d 815 (2d
Cir. 1964).
42384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
"Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 228 (1936).
10551972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
police station in the famous Escobedo v. Illinois46 decision. In Escobedo
the Court held inadmissible a statement obtained from a defendant after
he had been denied the assistance of counsel. Next, in Miranda v.
A rizona47 the Supreme Court established elaborate procedural safe-
guards designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination in the
police station even though the statements given by the accused were, by
traditional standards, voluntary. Miranda extended the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination to custodial interrogation.
Failure to follow the Miranda procedures means that any statements the
suspect made, however voluntarily, are inadmissible at trial.4" As a
consequence of the Escobedo and Miranda decisions, the exclusionary
rule applies to confessions and admissions even where the evidence is
not subject to challenge as inherently untrustworthy. As a result of the
interaction between the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the rule has evolved
that once a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way, he has a right to counsel
at every critical stage of the proceedings. 4 Any confessions or incrimi-
nating statements obtained from a suspect at a time when he is denied
his constitutional right to counsel must be excluded. 0
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,'1 applic-
able to federal criminal trials, purports to overturn Escobedo-Miranda
16378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
181d. See generally United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
ex rel Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
"E.g., Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at every stage of a criminal
proceeding at which substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected; there, proceeding to
revoke probation). Examples of critical stages other than the trial itself include Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (counsel required at preliminary hearing even though the hearing is not a
required step in the state's procedure); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup and
certain identification proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (custodial interrogations); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)
(preliminary examination wherein pleas to the charge are made); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961) (an arraignment, if certain defenses must be pleaded at that time or if the defendant
pleads guilty); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (the entering of a guilty plea at any time);
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing).
Examples of "non-critical" stages of the criminal proceedings at which the right to counsel
has been held not to exist include proceedings for taking and analyzing the accused's fingerprints,
handwriting samples, blood samples, and clothing. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966). See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-39 (1967).
"'See cases cited notes 47-49 supra.
3118 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970).
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to the extent that the absence of warnings required by these cases does
not, under the Act, per se render inadmissible a defendant's confession
or incriminating statements. Under this statute the sole test for admissi-
bility is voluntariness; failure to warn the accused of his rights is treated
as merely one factor in determining voluntariness. The constitutionality
of this legislation is presently undetermined, and, if it is constitutional,
its effect upon state criminal trials is unknown.
In federal courts, as a matter of judicial policy rather than of
constitutional law, the rule has developed that any statements made by
the arrestee while being detained unnecessarily before being taken to a
magistrate for arraignment must be excluded at trial.52 The roots of this
rule are found in the 1943 Supreme Court decision McNabb v. United
States.13 In the exercise of its "supervisory power" regarding the for-
mulation and application of proper standards for the enforcement of the
federal criminal law in federal courts, the Court held in McNabb that
incriminating statements elicited from defendants during unlawful de-
tention by federal officials are inadmissible in federal courts-even
though the illegal detention does not by itself make a resulting confes-
sion involuntary. The requirement was reiterated in Mallory v. United
States. 4 The Court now views the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule
as a judicial sanction for violations of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires that an arrested person be taken
before a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay."55
Although the McNabb-Mallory decisions were grounded upon the
Court's supervisory power over the federal courts, most commentators
viewed them as attempts by the Court to avoid the tremendous problems
inherent in the due process voluntariness test, and thus there was some
expectation that the McNabb-Mallory rule would ultimately be rested
upon a constitutional foundation and applied to the states. This did not
come to pass, perhaps because subsequent decisions holding that there
was a constitutional right to counsel at certain pretrial "critical stages"
provided a better stepping stone. The anticipated move away from sole
reliance upon the voluntariness test occurred in Escobedo v. Illinois.56
Escobedo was a cautious step, for the holding was carefully limited to
12See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
-318 U.S. 332 (1943).
51354 U.S. 449 (1957).
•FED. R. CRINI. P. 5(a).
'378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10571972]
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the unique facts of the case, but it was generally assumed that this newly
established right to counsel in the police station would thereafter be
expanded on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the Court just two years later
decided Miranda v. Arizona, 7 which was grounded upon the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and prescribed a specific
set of warnings as prerequisites to all future custodial interrogations.
The McNabb-Mallory rule was substantially overturned by the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.11 Under this Act,
as long as the statement is voluntarily made within six hours following
arrest or detention, it is admissible even though the defendant was not
yet arraigned. If the delay in arraignment is more than six hours, then
incriminating statements made by the accused will be admissible only
if the delay is shown to have been reasonable in view of the means of
transportation and the distance to be travelled to the magistrate.
The final major category in which the exclusionary rule is applica-
ble concerns identification testimony obtained in violation of the fifth
and sixth amendments. Lineups, identification evidence, the right to
counsel at lineup and identification proceedings, and the privilege
against self-incrimination were considered by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Wade" and Gilbert v. California."° The Court in Wade
held that a pretrial confrontation for the purpose of identification is a
critical stage in criminal proceedings at which the accused has a right
to have counsel present."' The Court emphasized that lineups are highly
unreliable unless fairly conducted."2 In-court identification evidence will
be excluded if tainted by such pretrial confrontation." The Court in
Gilbert noted that if the witness can identify the defendant without the
aid of the lineup and the lineup did not unduly influence him, the failure
to respect the defendant's right to counsel may be harmless error; 4 but
if the testimony of an identifying witness is the direct result of an illegal
lineup, exclusion of such testimony is the only effective sanction. 5
-384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1970).
-'388 U.S. 218 (1967). For a recent case, see United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir.
1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REv. 741 (1971).
1°388 U.S. 263 (1967).
61388 U.S. at 227-29.
21d. at 229-35.
'"Id. at 239-43.
"388 U.S. at 272-73.
"Id. at 273: "In the absence of legislative regulations adequate to avoid the hazards to a fair
trial which inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the desirability of deterring the constitutionally
1058 [Vol. 50
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The Court in Wade held that a lineup did not violate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting
his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identi-
fying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to
give evidence of a testimonial nature." Gilbert held that a handwriting
exemplar, as distinguished from the content of what is written, is an
identifying physical characteristic outside the protection of the fifth
amendment. 7 Gilbert and Wade rested on the sixth amendment counsel
guarantee. Nevertheless, the Court in Gilbert recognized that if a testi-
monial communication had occurred during these procedures, as where
the handwriting exemplar contained incriminating statements, the evi-
dence would be excluded under the fifth amendment. 8
Extensive criticism of Wade and Gilbert was voiced in Congress
during the consideration of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, but the only response in the version of the Act
ultimately adopted was the addition of the provision that "[tihe testi-
mony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the
commission of the crime. . . [is] admissible in evidence in [any federal
criminal prosecution]." 9
Quite apart from the issue of the right to counsel, a defendant may
be able to show that a pretrial confrontation resulted in such unfairness
that it infringed his right to due process of the law.70 In Palmer v.
Peyton,71 a rape case, the witness could give no description of her at-
tacker other than that he was a Negro who had a high pitched voice and
wore an orange-colored shirt. The police arrested the defendant on the
basis of information supplied by an informer. They showed the victim
the defendant's voice from an adjoining room. No other voices were
provided for comparison. This procedure was found so inherently
suggestive as to create a likelihood of mis-identification.72
objectionable practice must prevail over the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence."
11388 U.S. at 221-33.
11388 U.S. at 266-67.
-1d.
318 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970).
71E.g.. Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968).
7359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
7 Part 11 of this text is meant to give the reader some insight into the application of the
exclusionary rule in the four mentioned major categories. Admittedly, the discussion in Part II is
brief and far from exhaustive. It is therefore suggested that in order to understand more fully the
application of the exclusionary rule, the reader should familiarize himself with the doctrines of
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III. EXAMINATION OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule is the Supreme Court's technique for enforc-
ing police violations of constitutional guarantees. Two justifications
have been given for the exclusionary rule, one normative and one fac-
tual. 3 The normative justification is founded on the "evil" of govern-
ment participation in illegal conduct. It focuses on the anomaly of the
government's forbidding conduct on the one hand while at the same time
participating in forbidden conduct by using evidence acquired in viola-
tion of a defendant's constitutional rights. Justice Holmes thought it
better for some criminals to escape than for the government to "play
an ignoble part."74 Justice Brandeis spoke of the need to "preserve the
judicial process from contamination, ' 75 but he added the pragmatic
argument that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded to main-
tain respect for law and to promote confidence in the administration of
justice.
Professor Francis A. Allen gave modern voice to this justification
by suggesting that
perhaps it may be urged that any process of law which sanctions the
imposition of penalties upon an individual through the utilization of
the fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction, not only of
the rights of privacy but of the whole system of restraints on the
exercise of the public force which would seem to be inherent in the
"harmless error" and "standing" as they, relate to this subject matter. Furthermore, a more
complete understanding of the scope and limitations of the rule itself will be beneficial. However,
for the purposes of this comment Part II is sufficient.
Concerning the "harmless error" doctrine, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970);
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1964); Cameron & Osborn 11, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless,
1971 L. & Soc. ORDER 23; Note, Harmless Error-A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REv. 814 (1970).
Concerning the "standing" doctrine, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Comment, Standing to Object to an
Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 342 (1967).
Concerning scope and other limitations, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Comment, Search and Seizure by
Private Parties: An Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 LAND AND WATER L. R v. 653 (1970).
"Oaks, supra note 9, at 668.
7 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"7Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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concept of civil liberty.",
In a recent case, Terry v. Ohio, 77 the Supreme Court declared that
"[c]ourts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made
party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."
Neither the government nor the police should be permitted to profit
from its own wrong. The Supreme Court has referred to this normative
justification of the rule as "the imperative of judicial integrity."' 8
The factual justification for the rule is the assertion that excluding
evidence obtained unconstitutionally will reduce violations of the consti-
tutional prohibitions. It is argued that the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained by an unconstitutional method is expected to have the relatively
immediate effect of deterring law enforcement officials from improper
behavior. In addition, by stressing the seriousness of society's commit-
ment to observing the constitutional mandates, "the exclusionary rule
is expected to invoke the moral and educative force of the law and thus
to have the long term effect of encouraging greater conformity."'
79
When the Supreme Court has had to make decisions on the scope
of the exclusionary rule, its opinion has usually stressed and its reason-
ing seems to have been dictated by the factual considerations of deterr-
ence rather than the normative arguments of judicial integrity. Thus, in
Elkins v. United States,8" in which the Court decided that evidence
obtained in an illegal search by state officers must be excluded in a
federal criminal trial, the Court gave this explanation of the exclusion-
ary rule: "Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it."' The discursive prevailing opinion in Mapp
quoted the Elkins statement and otherwise characterized the exclusion-
ary rule as a "deterrent safeguard. 812
7 Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
REv. I. 20 (1950).
-392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
7 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
"Oaks, supra note I1, at 668. On the deterrence idea see Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 413 (1.966); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319. 334. See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
-364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"1'd. at 217. See also Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure: Another Look, 48
Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1953).
''Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 656 (1961).
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Especially since the Mapp decision in 1961, there have been vol-
umes of literature on the effectiveness of and the justification for the
exclusionary rule.83 The majority of the literature has been directed at
the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure context. With this in
mind, a large part of the following analysis will revolve around the rule
in this context.
(A) Search and Seizure
The critics of the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure are numerous. 4 It
seems safe to say that if a suitable alternative to the rule were found,
some of the critics would advocate complete abolition of the rule.8" The
preponderance of the criticism is directed at the exclusionary rule's
alleged ineffectiveness in deterring improper police conduct,86 although
the normative justification has also been challenged.87 The salient weak-
ness, so it is felt, of the exclusionary rule as a device to deter improper
'See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup.
CT. REV. 1; Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969):
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968); Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure 53 CALIF. L. Rev. 929 (1965); Kitch, The
Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 155; Katz,
The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L.
REV. 119 (1966); Oaks, supra note 11; Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police,
52 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962
DUKE L.J. 319.
'See, e.g., Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 A, . U.L. Rav. I (1964); Burns,
Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969); Oaks, supra note 9.
'Note should also be taken of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971). He proposed an alternative in the form of a model statute to be
enacted by Congress. This alternative is discussed in text accompanying notes 113-14 infra. See
also Oaks, supra note 9, at 667, 754-57. It should be noted that the advocates of the abolition of
the exclusionary rule, at least in the fourth amendment context, may find themselves facing a
constitutional obstacle. The argument has been made that the exclusionary rule is not a mere
evidentiary rule but a right inherent in the protections and mandates of the fourth amendment.
This view seems to be engendered from language of the Court in Weeks, Wolf, and Mapp. See
generally Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Privacy Embodied in Fourth Amendment Made
Applicable to the States, 24 GA. B.J. 445 (1962).
"At this point the most recurring criticisms of the rule are set forth without citation to any
particular critic. See generally authorities cited in notes 83 & 84 supra for the expression of these
criticisms.
"One commentator argues that although the normative justification "continues to appear in
the rhetoric of Supreme Court decisions, it is doubtful that this argument decides cases." Oaks,
supra note 9, at 669. He feels that the principal justification for the rule is the factual one, the
normative justification no longer being viable.
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police behavior is that its penal effect is felt only when a case comes to
court and there is an attempt to introduce illegally obtained evidence
to secure a conviction. Consequently, the exclusionary rule is not likely
to be an effective deterrent against official misconduct if that miscon-
duct is not directed toward acquiring evidence or if the evidence sought
is not intended to be used in a prosecution.
Another defect mentioned is that policemen who have been guilty
of improper behavior are not affected in their persons or pocketbooks
by the application of the rule. The immediate impact of the rule falls
not upon the police but upon the prosecutor who is attempting to obtain
a conviction. Furthermore, in terms of direct corrective effect, the exclu-
sionary rule benefits only those persons actually incriminated by ille-
gally obtained evidence. It does nothing to recompense an injury suf-
fered by the victim of an illegal search that turns up nothing incriminat-
ing.
On the other hand, the rule has not escaped criticism by the various
law enforcement officials. They insist that the exclusionary rule hand-
cuffs the police and prevents effective law enforcement.
There are, of course, those who support the rule."8 They argue that
the rule does deter improper police conduct. One advocate says that the
exclusionary rule is the "best we have" 89 and that it is "the most
effective remedy we possess to deter police lawlessness." 9 Many feel
that the rule has an important practical influence in that it creates a
genuine incentive for police departments to educate their members in
the constitutional rights of suspected persons. 9' One advocate offers the
opinion that the rule has substantial regulative effect because it subjects
the individual officer "to the pressure of those charged with making an
efficient record of criminal convictions to avoid conduct which imperils
successful prosecution. Furthermore, the regulative effect of public
opinion . . . is more likely to become a reality where the consequence
of an official invasion of privacy may be to deprive the state of power
"See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. I; Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J.
CRN . L.C. & P.S. (1962); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig, Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959); Katz, Supreme Court and the State:
An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1966); Paulsen, The
Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
"'Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 74 (1957).
"Paulsen, supra note 88, at 257.
"See, e.g.. id. See also Paulsen, supra note 89, at 74.
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to secure the conviction of a serious offender.""2
Perhaps one of the best known of the rule's enthusiasts is Professor
Yale Kamisar. He feels the factual justification for the rule is viable.
His view is based on the belief that although the data is inconclusive as
to whether the rule does deter, the evidence is relatively conclusive that
all other existing alternatives do not.
93
Many advocates of the exclusionary rule reject the "handcuffing
the police" argument. They feel that this argument is merely a protest
against the underlying constitutional and statutory rights.94 If there is a
negative effect, then it is an effect of the constitutional rules, not an
effect of the exclusionary rule as a means chosen for their enforcement.
Law enforcement officials who advance the "handcuffing" argument
are in the untenable position of urging that the sanction be abolished
so that they can continue to violate the rules with impunity.
Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes, among others, felt that the
rule was justified on the normative rationale. 5 Furthermore, recent
decisions indicate that this remains a vital justification for the rule.9
Former Chicago District Attorney Mitchel Ware agrees with these two
Justices in this respect.
I feel that the strongest argument in favor of the exclusionary rule is
the need to preserve the judicial process from contamination. Our
society cannot tolerate the use of evidence which has been obtained
through a violation of the law, without undermining not only respect
for the courts, but also for the law itself, of which the courts are
allegedly the custodians.
The arguments on both sides of the factual question of whether the
exclusionary rule is an effective deterrent of police lawlessness suffer
"2Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
REv. I, 20 (1950).
'Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1150 (1959).
"See. e.g., Oaks, supra note 9, at 754; Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented
Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 440 (1964).
"sSee, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470,484-85 (1928) (Brandeis & Holmes,
J.J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
7Letter from Mr. Mitchel Ware to the author, Feb. 7, 1972, on file in the North Carolina
Law Review Office.
The discussion thus far concerning the arguments for and against the rule in the search and
seizure context should give the reader an insight into the war that is being waged. However, the
arguments set forth above are by no means exhaustive.
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from a lack of conclusive empirical data. Consequently, both sides rely
on guesswork that can persuade only those predisposed to sympathize
with the particular viewpoint expressed.
Studies that have attempted to measure the impact of the exclu-
sionary rule on police behavior have proved inconclusive.2 8 Nevertheless,
they have shown that police training in search and seizure rules is more
extensive where there is an exclusionary rule and that the rule has
contributed to an increase in police awareness of constitutional rights
and requirements. 9 These studies indicate that most judges, prosecu-
tors, police officers, and lawyers believe that the rule is an effective way
to reduce illegal searches.' 0
The exclusionary rule was applied to the states only after the Su-
preme Court had accumulated considerable experience with police vio-
lations of the fourth amendment. Frustrated in less stringent efforts to
control the abuses, the Supreme Court ultimately resigned itself to em-
ployment of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule was never
conceived of as a final solution for the problem. Necessarily under-
inclusive as well as over-inclusive in its reach, the rule was employed
nevertheless because the Court realized that without it violations of the
constitutional guarantee were beyond its effective control. As Professor
Kamisar argued before Mapp was decided, "The fact that there is little
agreement and little evidence that the exclusionary rule does deter police
lawlessness is much less significant, I think, than the fact that there is
much agreement and much evidence that all other existing alternatives
do not."' 0 '
As the discussion thus far indicates, there is no definitive answer
to whether the exclusionary rule can be factually justified. Certainly it
is arguable that the deterrent function is operative in the situation in
which the main police objective is to obtain a conviction. At any rate,
the rule should not be abandoned until substantial evidence is presented
to indicate that its factual basis is unjustifiable. 2
"See, e.g., Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North
Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1966); Nagel, Testing
the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283; Oaks, supra note 9, at
709. See generally Allen, supra note 88, at 34. See also the numerous studies set forth and examined
in Oaks, supra note 9, at 678-709.
"Oaks, supra note 9, at 708. See also Nagel, supra note 98, at 283-86.
"'See generally Katz, supra note 98; Oaks, supra note 9, at 708.
"'Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1150 (1959).
"' As indicated earlier, the data thus far accumulated concerning the effectiveness of the
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In light of the attacks on the factual basis of the rule, perhaps its
normative basis should be re-emphasized. Some recent decisions indi-
cate that this remains a vital justification for the rule."' In our times
it seems essential that we do what is necessary to preserve the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity" and to enforce constitutional mandates.
(B) Confessions, Identification Evidence, and Due Process
In addition to being the most frequent occasion for application of
the exclusionary rule, search and seizure has two qualities that set it
apart from other areas and make it appropriate for separate study.
Evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure is just as reliable as
evidence obtained by legal means. This cannot always be said of evi-
dence obtained by improper methods of lineup identification or interro-
gation. And, the exclusion of evidence obtained by an improper search
and seizure is less likely to influence law enforcement behavior than is
the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper means of identification
or interrogation or by coercive methods."t 4
Informed observers have suggested a variety of goals or motiva-
tions other than obtaining convictions that may prompt police arrest
and search and seizure."0 5 These include arrest or confiscation as a pri-
mitive sanction, arrest for the purpose of controlling prostitution, arrest
of an intoxicated person for his own safety, search for the purpose of
recovering stolen property, search for the purpose of removing weapons
or contraband such as narcotics from circulation, and search for weap-
exclusionary rule is inconclusive. What is required to test the effectiveness of the rule is a complete
and decisive empirical study of its deterrent effect on police misconduct. Professor Oaks has
indicated that prior research has not demonstrated a method by which this important question can
be determined. However, in his article he reviewed various aspects of deterrence suggested in the
literature on the deterrent effect of punishment, applied them to the exclusionary rule, and dis-
cussed possible techniques and areas for further research. Oaks, supra note 9, at 709-20. With
Professor Oaks' suggestions in mind, a test could be developed to measure the deterrent effect of
the rule. Once a test is developed it should be administered on a nationwide basis, perhaps by a
special committee of the American Bar Association.
'°3See. e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
"01See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967); REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAWv ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 181 (1967); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 48.
115W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, chs. 21-24 (1965);
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police
and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 448-55 (1965); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL 220 (1967).
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ons that might be used against the searching office. A large proportion
of police behavior is thus not likely to be responsive to any deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule.
The variety of reasons why an improper search and seizure takes
place is in marked contrast to the limited objectives motivating police
to engage in the kinds of illegal conduct that cause the exclusion of a
coerced confession or an improper lineup identification. In exceptional
situations a person may be interrogated just to obtain the recovery of
stolen property or to locate a kidnapped person, all without the inten-
tion of prosecuting, but the predominant incentive for interrogation is
to obtain evidence for use in court. Consequently, police conduct in this
area is likely to be responsive to judicial rules governing the admissibil-
ity. "There can be no doubt [that the Supreme Court's rulings about
interrogation procedures] had much to do with the fact that today the
third degree is almost non-existent."'0 6 One commentator has observed
that the problem of interrogation was relatively easy to bring under
judicial control by appellate decisions "precisely because it was part of
the crime solving function of the police .. ."'1 The same success may
be expected for the new rulings on lineup identifications.
Nevertheless, many of the arguments advanced against the exclu-
sionary rule in the search and seizure context have also been advanced
in the interrogation and lineup contexts.' For example, Professor Am-
sterdam argues that the decisions of the Supreme Court have had a very
limited effect on the police in protecting the rights of suspects.0 9 Profes-
sor Driver adds: "The Miranda warnings fail to provide safeguards
against the social psychological rigors of arrest and interrogation except
to the extent they prevent interrogation altogether.""10
There have also been empirical studies of the effect of the exclu-
sionary rule in these other areas. For example, since the Miranda deci-
sion in 1966, a number of empirical studies have sought to trace its
impact on interrogation procedures."' However,
'"REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967).
1o1J. WILSO}k, supra note 104, at 48.
"'See generally Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785 (1970); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion,
82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968).
"0See generally Amsterdam, supra note 108.
"'Driver, supra note 108, at 59-61.
"'See, e.g., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967);
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[a]t this time, it is difficult to synthesize the observations of these
projects into comprehensive conclusions. Potential for generalization
is undercut by frequently inadequate or unrepresentative sample
groups, by the lack of comparative data of police practices before
Miranda, and by the differences in methods among the various pro-
jects."1
2
Therefore, any empirical study undertaken to examine the rule in the
search and seizure context should include a study of the effect of the rule
in all of its contexts.
IV. THE ADDITION OF MORE "BITE" TO THE RULE
(A) The Burger Proposal: Is Replacement Rather Than Supplementa-
tion Feasible?
In his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents,"' Chief
Justice Burger suggested that Congress should develop an administra-
tive or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to afford
compensation and restitution for persons whose fourth amendment
rights have been violated. He found the conceptual basis for his remedy
in the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior. He also set forth guide-
lines for a model statute which Congress could enact."4
The alternative that Chief Justice Burger proposed in Bivens seems
to be inadequate in various respects and should not be adopted. The
model guidelines do provide a cause of action against the government
Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburg-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. I (1967);
Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practice and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by
Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 425.
"2S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 945 (2d ed. 1969),
11403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
III
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement officials
committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person aggrieved
by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes
regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned after the
United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evidence secured
for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be excluded from




for damages, but there is no provision to compensate a plaintiff for the
cost of bringing such a suit. The fact that one may lose and go un-
reimbursed for the costs of pursuing the suit would seem to be a deter-
rent to bringing it. Therefore, it is doubtful that an individual of low
income could afford to bring a suit under this proposal. Furthermore,
under the proposed guidelines it is arguable that government liability for
police "torts" is not a sufficient condition for effective deterrence. Some
police illegality is an inevitable concomitant of the human element in
law enforcement, and departmental policymakers, according to their
own scheme of values, may find it advantageous to violate now and pay
later. Such a decision is especially likely in situations in which the
exclusionary rule does not apply and there is no other deterrent-in
other words, where prosecution is not contemplated and conviction is
not the motivating factor.
It should be noted that the damages recoverable under the proposed
guidelines are not assessed against the "guilty" officer but apparently
come from the government itself. The police officer does not seem to
be directly chastized for his sins. In addition, the scope of the alternative
proposed is very narrow. It includes only fourth amendment violations
by federal officers. Nothing in the guidelines purports to cover other
constitutional violations or violations by state officers. Chief Justice
Burger assumes that if the proposed statute is constitutional the states
will adopt similar remedial systems based on the federal model, but no
foundation is laid for this assumption. It should be noted that histori-
cally most states have refused to waive governmental immunity in police
"tort" cases despite repeated urgings by scholars.
One strong criticism of the exclusionary rule has been that it does
not deter when police act in situations in which prosecution is not con-
templated. If officers merely seek to harass a citizen, the exclusionary
rule does not influence the officers to cease. However, this is not neces-
sarily a telling argument against the rule; it may be viewed as calling
only for the creation of other remedies. The need is for supplementation,
not abandonment. As was indicated earlier, the exclusionary rule was
not designed to be the final solution for the problem.
Some of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years also
indicate a need for the exclusionary rule to be supplemented. One im-
portant group of decisions arose in the "harmless error" doctrine con-
text. Affecting the reach of the exclusionary rule is the doctrine of
"harmless error," under which convictions are not to be reversed unless
the error has prejudiced the defendant's case. Mr. Justice Black's major-
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ity opinion in Chapman v. California"5 established that the issue of
whether or not a federal constitutional error is harmless is governed by
federal law and that all constitutional errors are not necessarily harmful.
But the Court held that
before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original
task of applying such a test, it is a familiar standard to all courts, and
we believe its adoption will provide a more workable standard . . .
[than the former requirement that there be a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the convic-
tion]." 6
On June 2, 1969, however, the Supreme Court held in Harrington
v. California'7 that a constitutional error in the trial of a criminal
offense was harmless because "overwhelming" untainted evidence sup-
ported the conviction. The three dissenters in Harrington declared that
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will ultimately be substan-
tially vitiated by this approach to the question of harmless error."8
The need for supplementation is further illustrated by the fact that
the rule as it now operates neither protects innocent persons from illegal
police conduct nor compensates them for breaches of their constitu-
tional rights."' Furthermore, the rule does not punish the police who
participate in this illegal conduct. Even in the situations in which there
is a prosecution, rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the
wrongdoing official.
Thus, the need for additional-not substitutional-remedies for
enforcing the substantive rules governing police conduct is apparent.
Less apparent is which of the various possibilities is soundest theoreti-
cally and practically.
t'386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"'Id. at 24.
117395 U.S. 250 (1969).
1'd. at 255. See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). This decision, like the present
"harmless error" doctrine, seems to undercut the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.
"'See generally Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949); 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2184,
at 51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
For example, illegal arrests which are designed to harass rather than to prosecute, physical
abuse of suspects or persons in custody, unnecessary destruction of property, illegal detentions
which are not motivated by a desire to secure confessions, and similar serious forms of police
illegality are not affected by the exclusionary rule.
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(B) Tort Actions in State Courts
In general, a policeman is personally liable under state law for torts
arising from his law enforcement activities."" Consideration of tort lia-
bility must proceed simultaneously on two fronts: effectiveness as a
deterrent and utility as a mode of redress. In order to eliminate violent
response to alleged police misconduct, our society must achieve both of
these objectives. The average citizen must be confident that police mis-
conduct is the deviant rather than the normal behavior and that he can
effectively redress injuries suffered because of police improprieties.
Causes of action theoretically encompassing police misconduct are
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, trespass, and
assault and battery. These tort actions have proved inadequate. The
present tort remedies are ill-suited for controlling the police since the
measure of damages is not related to the enormity of the wrong commit-
ted. Instead, the damages are determined by the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, and that injury often cannot be measured in economic terms.2 '
This defect could be remedied by changes in the measure of damages.'
An initial defect in civil recovery both as a means of redress and
as a deterrent to police misconduct is the cost of the suit. Unfortunately,
litigation is most costly (and consequently least attractive) in those cases
in which redress is most needed-brutality cases in which recovery is
likely to depend on the resolution of disputed factual issues necessitating
a protracted trial.
There are other criticisms of the existing tort remedies, such as the
reluctance of juries to find significant damages against police officers,
especially in favor of a plaintiff who was an accused or convicted crimi-
nal. Fortunately, there are some signs of change in these areas.
2 3
An effective tort remedy against the offending officer or his em-
"'See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. Rev. 493 (1955); Rubenstein, Liability in Tort of Judicial Officers, 15 U. TORONTO L. REV.
317 (1964); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 127-36, 834-59, 987-92 (4th ed. 1971). Federal
officers can be sued in state courts on state causes of action, but by virtue of a special federal statute
these federal officers may remove to the federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1970). See
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49 N.C.L. REV. 1, 17-
23 (1970).
'See Foote, supra note 120, at 504-16. Professor Foote discusses the present tort actions and
their inadequacies and makes suggestions for an effective tort remedy.
121d.
1'Recent cases in the federal courts may portend the development of one or more effective
federal damage remedies against illegal law enforcement conduct. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown-
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970). On the subject of damages, a Seventh Circuit decision held
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ployer could be a useful supplement to the exclusionary rule.' A practi-
cal tort remedy would give courts an occasion to rule on the content of
constitutional rights and could provide a viable remedy with attendant
direct deterrent effect upon the police whether or not the injured party
was prosecuted.
However, the fact that several crucial variables are unknown prob-
ably will prevent immediate heavy reliance on the state tort remedy.
These factors include the extent to which persons who are harmed by
illegal police conduct actually would resort to such a remedy (the utiliza-
tion of remedy) and the extent to which official agencies would attempt
to prevent illegal conduct if they were subjected to liability therefor (the
deterence element).
(C) Causes of Action under Section 1983
In addition to state common law tort remedies, a citizen aggrieved
by police misconduct may have a cause of action under section 1983,
the present embodiment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,115 which creates
a federal cause of action for the deprivation under color of state law of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
... -126 It should be immediately apparent that the Act of 1871 ap-
plies only to state action and not to federal action. Congress has not
passed a general statute making federal officers liable for acts commit-
ted "under color" but in violation of their federal authority.
2
1
that a plaintiff in a civil rights action could recover for attorneys fees incurred and for confinement
suffered as a result of the invasion of his constitutional rights. Kerr v. Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134
(7th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit recently held that a youth whom a police officer had shot in a
reckless use of force during an arrest attempt could recover damages under the Civil Rights Act
and could also recover damages-including pain and suffering-for assault and battery under a
pendent claim based on state law. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
121See generally Foote, s upra note 120; Oaks, supra note 9, at 756-57.
'2Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
12642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
See also Comment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding
the Guards, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LB. L. REV. 104 (1970); Note, Section 1983: A Civil
Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 839 (1964).
"'Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). The Court held that it would not fill the
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Section 1983 was originally designed to remedy the widespread
abridgment of the rights of Negroes that characterized the Reconstruc-
tion period in the South. 2' Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
read the broad statutory language to authorize civil tort suits in federal
courts against state law enforcement officers, and a steady stream of
such cases now flows through the lower federal courts.
Section 1983 derives much of its present strength from Monroe v.
Pape,2 1 which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1961. In that
landmark case James Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago policemen
broke into his home at 5:45 a.m., routed his whole family from bed,
ransacked every room in his house, detained him at the police station
for ten hours on "open charges," and finally released him without filing
criminal charges against him. The Supreme Court held that these alle-
gations were actionable under section 1983. The Court noted that even
action wholly contrary to state law is nevertheless action "under color
of law" if the policemen are clothed with the indices of authority. More-
over, the Monroe majority held that since section 1983 (foes not include
the word "willfully," a complainant need neither allege nor prove a
"specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."'30 Finally, the
Court reasoned that since one of the purposes of section 1983 was to
afford a federal right in federal courts, the federal remedy is supplemen-
tary to any existing state remedy and the state remedy need not be
exhausted before the invocation of section 1983.31
One issue that remained after the Monroe decision was whether
some degree of bad faith or other fault in the deprivation of the citizen's
constitutional rights is an element of the federal cause of action under
section 1983. The Court confronted this issue in 1967 in Pierson v.
Ray.3 2 In that case petitioners, a group of Negro and white clergymen,
were arrested for sitting in at a segregated interstate bus terminal in
Mississippi. Subsequent to their arrest and conviction, the statutory
provision upon which their arrest had been based was declared
"hiatus" Congress has left in this area. Note the judicially created civil damages remedy for fourth
amendment violations by federal law enforcement officials (who are not covered by § 1983) in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970).
'See generally Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 70 (1964).
n365 U.S. 167 (1961).
"'Id. at 187.
1 1Id. at 183.
132386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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unconstitutional, and their cases were remanded and later dropped. In
their subsequent suit under section 1983, the Supreme Court proclaimed
that the defenses of "good faith and probable cause" were available to
the policemen.'
Although the Pierson decision established that policemen are not
strictly liable for unconstitutional activity, the scope of the defenses
which it recognized is not yet clear. An additional question remaining
after Pierson is the scope of police activity covered by the "rights,
privileges, or immunities" clause of section 1983. It clearly covers illegal
searches or seizures and unconstitutional arrests. And it would seem
that it also covers gross acts of police brutality, conduct which denies
due process because it shocks the conscience. However, Section 1983
cannot be employed to regulate the day-to-day conduct of the policeman
on patrol.
Thus, section 1983, a potentially useful device for compensating
individuals who are substantially injured by unconstitutional police con-
duct, is uncertain with respect to both its scope and the defenses to a
cause of action under it. In addition, section 1983 is subject to all the
intrinsic weaknesses of the existing state tort remedy' and also to the
additional limitation of affording a cause of action only against state
law enforcement officers.'35 Despite these inherent limitations, how-
ever, section 1983's federal remedy for deprivation of constitutional
rights does permit compensation of citizens whose persons or property
is significantly damaged due to clearly unlawful police activity.
(D) The Injunction as a Supplement
One potentially effective type of judicial relief-the injunc-
tion-has been largely ignored. This seems especially strange when one
considers that the exclusionary sanction is limited to evidence offered
at trial, whereas the injunction may be employed to deter conduct in
advance of any trial. The injunction offers the prospect of immediate
relief from unconstitutional conduct and a powerful deterrent from en-
gaging in that specific conduct. Simply as a matter of judicial equitable
prerogative, such relief is easily justified: section 1983 is available in "an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding . . . ,," and
-Id. at 555-57.
'"See text accompanying notes 120-24 supra.
13'See note 126 supra.
1342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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the use of the injunction to deter unconstitutional police conduct was
generally approved by the Supreme Court in the only case to raise the
issue-Hague v. C.I. 0.117 In Hague, the C.I.O. sought to enjoin the
mayor, the police chief, and other officials of Jersey City from continu-
ing an anti-union harassment campaign of arrests, deportation of organ-
izers, and suppression of union circulars and public meetings. The dis-
trict court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants and
their agents from continuing their deliberate policy of constitutional
violations. With two dissents from the seven Justices sitting, the Su-
preme Court affirmed.
38
If the injunction is to have any utility as a remedy for police abuse,
it must mandate affirmative action by the officials responsible for police
conduct. Section 1983 authorizes the imposition of liability on high
police officials. 39 Certainly a police commissioner acts "tinder color of
[a] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of [a] State or
Territory."'' 0 The decisions implementing the Supreme Court's rulings
on school desegregation and legislative reapportionment clearly demon-
strate that a federal court has the power to vindicate federal constitu-
tional rights by issuing a mandatory injunction against state and local
officials. "' If confronted with a pattern of tolerated violations of the
constitutional rights of certain individuals, the court should declare the
existence of the wrong and direct the police commissioner to correct it.
At any rate, the use of an injunction as a supplement should be more
fully and carefully explored.
(E) Increasing the "Bite" of the Rule Itself
It can be argued that the direct effect of the exclusionary rule has
'7307 U.S. 496 (1939), affg with modifications 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939). affg 25 F. Supp.
127 (D.N.J. 1938).
"'Other cases involving injunctive relief against improper police conduct include Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820 (1967). On the use of federal
injunctive relief from unconstitutional police conduct, see Federal Injunctive Relief From Illegal
Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104 (comment on Lankford, supra); Comment, The Federal Injunc-
tion as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968); Annot., Pro-
priety of Federal Injunction Against Use in State Criminal Trial of Evidence Unlawfully Ob-
tained, 27 L. ED. 2D 984 (1971).
132See generally Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
"42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
"'See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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been reduced by limitations of its scope. Some of these limitations have
recently been removed, but at least one remains. Courts employ the
exclusionary rule only at the behest of a person who has "standing" to
make the motion to suppress.112 For example, in the search and seizure
context to have standing a person must be aggrieved by the unlawful
search and seizure.1 3 A person has no standing to invoke the exclusion-
ary rule, however, if the evidence was obtained through an unlawful
invasion of the rights of some other person, even though the evidence is
being used in an attempt to convict the former of a crime.'
The standing limitation is inconsistent with both of the asserted
justifications for the exclusionary rule. If the rule is meant to deter the
police and avoid judicial involvement in illegal behavior, it should ex-
clude all evidence obtained in violation of constitutional prohibitions
without inquiry into whose rights were violated. Following this reason-
ing, several commentators have urged abolition of the standing require-
ment. 45 Thus far only the California Supreme Court has heeded the
call. "'46
(F) Civil Actions for Damages in Federal Courts
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,'47 the Supreme Court
upheld a private claim for money damages in federal court against
federal agents for violation of guarantees secured by the fourth amend-
ment. This decision is especially important because there is no "federal
officer" counterpart to section 1983, which provides a cause of action
against state officers. The Court in Bivens, however, did not decide
whether a federal officer may employ an immunity defense, nor did it
detail the scope or limitations of such an action.
Congress has recently made it a crime to execute a search warrant
with unnecessary severity or willfully to exceed one's authority in exe-
cuting it,1s to procure the issuance of a search warrant maliciously and
"'See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968). See generally White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 333 (1970).
"'See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
"'Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
"'See, e.g., Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties,
45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1950); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE
L.J. 319, 335.
"'People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
147403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4818 U.S.C. § 2234 (1970).
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without probable cause,' or to search maliciously without a warrant
and without reasonable cause. 5 " Arguably, an implied civil right of
action for damages would also lie for violation of these provisions.,'
(G) Some other Considerations
The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is dependent to some
extent on whether the rules it is supposed to enforce are stated with
sufficient clarity to be understood and followed by police officers. This
point applies not only to the direct deterrent effect of the rule but also
to its longer range moral and educative effect. "For if the trumpet give
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle?"'' 2 Though
undoubtedly clear in some areas of police behavior, the procedures to
be followed are notoriously complex in others. In this respect the courts
and legislatures can do much by providing clarity in the decisions and
laws they make.
Consideration should be given to implementing legislation which
would impose the penalty for constitutional violations directly on police
officials rather than letting it fall on the prosecutor who is attempting
to obtain a conviction or upon society as a whole. In fact, several
authorities have proposed legislation to impose liability on political
subdivisions the officers of which have committed an offense. 53 Fur-
thermore, more efficient intra-departmental discipline of the police
should be considered.'54 Internal review is undoubtedly the quickest and
most efficient method of regulating the conduct of peace officers. A
punishment decreed by an insider such as a police chief is likely to be
accepted by both the officer guilty of misconduct and the department
as a whole.
149d. § 2235 (1970).
'"0Id. § 2236 (1970).
'51See generally Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (cause of action in favor of private
individual against another private individual for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)); Jenkins
v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) (civil action for
damages for anyone injured by illegal wiretapping); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) (action for deprivation
of rights under color of law).
I'1 Corinthians 14:8. Professor Oaks translates this as follows: "[i]f the rules are a clarion
call for protecting the rights of the individual, then the trumpet gives an uncertain call." Oaks,
supra note 9, at 731.
"'See, e.g., 3 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 25.17, 26.03 (1958); Mathes
& Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions,
53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1964).
'See generally GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966); Note, The Administration
of Complaints by Civilains Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REv. 499 (1964).
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While a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Chief Justice Burger made an interesting suggestion of a method
to reinforce the impact of the exclusionary rule:
As we see it, unless implemented, the Suppression Doctrine is a mani-
festation of sterile indignation and is essentially negative ....
Something more is needed; as a starting point, some of us-a minority
at the moment-would direct the District Court, in every case where
evidence is suppressed because of an officer's violation of a statute or
constitutional provision, to send a copy of the transcript on the motion
to suppress evidence to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia
and other executive officials having responsibility for those officers
whose actions are found to warrant suppression of vital evidence in a
criminal case.' 5
Professor Amsterdam feels that those outside the judicial systems, such
as community groups and police departments, must take the lead in
protecting the rights of defendants by formulation of rules for police
conduct. He points out that that the Supreme Court, like any other
court, lacks the sort of supervisory power over the practices of the police
that is possessed by the chief-of-police or the district attorney. The
Court can review police practices and thus define the rights of suspects
subject to those practices only when the practices become an issue in a
law suit.'
CONCLUSION
Despite some weaknesses and limitations in scope, the exclusionary
rule should not be abolished. Rather, there is a need for additional
remedies to supplement the rule. If constitutional rights are to be any-
thing more than pious pronouncements, some measurable consequence
must attend their violation.
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely apart from any
direct deterrent effect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial review
of police procedures and gives credibility to constitutional guarantees.
By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the
violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and
magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long term
115Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 257-58 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'56See generally Amsterdam, supra note 108; Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for
Fourth Amendment Standards; The Problem of Stop And Frisk, 45 CONN. B.J. 146 (1971).
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